Journal of Intellectual Property Law
Volume 25

Issue 1

Article 4

April 2017

The FTC and Modern Common Carrier Regulation in the Telecom
Context
Cody Lee Shubert
University of Georgia School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Cody L. Shubert, The FTC and Modern Common Carrier Regulation in the Telecom Context, 25 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 41 (2017).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol25/iss1/4

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Intellectual Property Law by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more
information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

Shubert: The FTC and Modern Common Carrier Regulation in the Telecom Conte
JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

7/29/2018 3:44 PM

THE FTC AND MODERN COMMON CARRIER
REGULATION IN THE TELECOM CONTEXT
Cody Lee Shubert*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................42

II.

BACKGROUND ................................................................................................42
A. FTC ACT GENERALLY .............................................................................42
B. COMMUNICATIONS REGULATION .......................................................44
C. RECENT DECISIONS IN AT&T CASES ...................................................45

III.

DISCUSSION ....................................................................................................49
A. LEGAL CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................50
B. POLICY RESULTS......................................................................................51

IV.

CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................54

*

J.D. Candidate, 2018, University of Georgia School of Law.

41

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2017

1

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 4
JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

42

7/29/2018 3:44 PM

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 25:41

I. INTRODUCTION
In Federal Trade Commission v. AT&T Mobility, LLC,1 the Ninth Circuit
recently ruled that common carriers, whether or not they are acting in their
common carrier capacity, are exempt from regulation under the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC Act).2 The case concerned whether or not AT&T was
liable, under the unfair and deceptive practices prong of the statute, for slowing
down data services to customers who used too much data, even though many
of these customers were under contract for “unlimited data” plans.3
Although AT&T has long been recognized as a common carrier in actions
pertaining to its landline services, its mobile services were not considered a
common carrier at the time that the case was filed.4 Reversing the District
Court’s denial of AT&T’s motion to dismiss, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
statue’s plain language and legislative history suggested that the exception was
intended to apply to all actions by a common carrier.5 Thus, common carriers
are no longer subject to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulation for unfair
and deceptive practices.6
Until the Ninth Circuit’s decision, courts and the FTC have interpreted this
exception oppositely, i.e., to apply only when the common carrier was acting in
its capacity as a common carrier.7 This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit
decision is both wrong and will lead to bad results. The decision is wrong
because the court assumes that the plain language of the statute unambiguously
closes to door to the FTC argument, which it does not. The Ninth Circuit also
said that even if the statute’s language was ambiguous, the legislative history
suggests a ruling in AT&T’s favor.8 A closer look at the legislative history
reveals that this is also untrue. Because the statute is ambiguous and the
legislative history is not clear, the FTC’s interpretation of the statute should win
the day.
II. BACKGROUND
A. FTC ACT GENERALLY

In order to respond to the growing concern over monopolies and their
effect on consumers, competitors, and the marketplace as a whole, Congress
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

835 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 864 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2017).
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012).
AT&T, 835 F.3d 993.
Id. at 996.
Id. at 998–1003.
Id. at 1003.
See, e.g., id. at 996.
Id. at 999–1003.
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passed the FTC Act9 in 1914.10 Of particular import in Congress’s decision to
enact the statute was to create an administrative agency powerful enough to
handle regulation of large corporations after the consolidation and merger wave
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.11
The Act, among other things, allows the FTC to regulate “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,”12 and gives the FTC the
power to enforce this provision through administrative proceedings, cease and
desist orders subject to judicial review, and injunctive relief in federal courts.13
The FTC uses § 45 of the Act to regulate a variety of business activities
affecting commerce. These activities range from violations of antitrust laws
under the “unfair” prong14 to misrepresentation in advertising to consumers
under the “deceptive acts or practices” prong.15 In the intellectual property
context, the FTC has used § 45 to regulate things like the deceptive use of
trademarks16 and patents.17
To prevent the FTC from stepping on other regulating agencies’ toes,
Congress inserted a provision exempting a number of different kind of
institutions from regulation under the FTC Act. The Act exempts:
banks, savings and loan institutions described in section 57a(f)(3)
of this title, Federal credit unions described in section 57a(f)(4) of
this title, common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate
commerce, air carriers and foreign air carriers subject to part A of
subtitle VII of Title 49, and persons, partnerships, or
corporations insofar as they are subject to the Packers and
Stockyards Act, 1921.18
This was not the original language in the Act’s exception. Congress later added
the “insofar as” language to the Packers and Stockyards exception.19 As will be
discussed later, Congress’s intent in amending the Act and the ramifications that

FTC Act, supra note 2.
See generally Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and
Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 98 (2003) (discussing the history and motivations behind the
passage of the FTC Act and creation of the Federal Trade Commission).
11 Id. at 6.
12 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
13 1 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 10:1 (2017).
14 Id.
15 See Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992) (FTC seeking cease and desist against
Kraft for advertisements that misrepresented the quality and content of their cheese slices).
16 See Niresk Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1960).
17 Decker v. FTC, 176 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
18 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012).
19 FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 835 F.3d 993 (9th Cir 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 864 F.3d 995
(9th Cir. 2017).
9
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this amendment may have are in debate.20 The language of the Packers and
Stockyards exception is important for this Note because it helps color how the
common carrier exception should be interpreted.
Some courts and
commentators have said that Congress added this language to make a change in
the way that those subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act were regulated,21
while others argue that Congress was simply ensuring that lower courts were
interpreting its existing intent correctly.22
B. COMMUNICATIONS REGULATION

Generally, a common carrier is a business that holds itself out to the public
as one that will carry goods or services indiscriminately so long as the person
attempting to use the common carrier pays the going rate.23 Because the
businesses hold themselves out to the public in such a way, they are generally
regulated to a much higher degree, and they generally must do business on “just
and reasonable terms.”24 Because of this, they must refrain from discriminating,
for any reason, against those who want to use their services.25
Although this distinction originally applied only to businesses engaged in
transportation, Congress began treating communications companies as
common carriers in 1910.26 Because of neglect by the Interstate Commerce
Commission, the federal agency tasked with common carrier regulation at the
time, Congress created the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) with
the Communications Act of 193427 and tasked it with regulating the
communications industry.28 Many types of communications entities are
implicated by the definition because they generally reward the carriage of the
communication so long as the customer pays for the service. This may include
entities carrying radio, television, and cellular services.29 Recently, the FCC has
reclassified broadband services as common carrier services. Thus, many of the
large corporations that consumers have the most contact with offer some form
of common carrier services.

20 Compare 835 F.3d 993, at 999–1000, with FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1087,
at 1097–99 (N.D. Cal. 2015), rev’d, 835 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 864 F.3d 995
(9th Cir. 2017), and Crosse & Blackwell Co. v. FTC, 262 F.2d 600, 604–05 (4th Cir. 1959).
21 835 F.3d 993, at 999–1000.
22 262 F.2d 600, 604–05.
23 Common Carrier, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
24 FTC v. Verity Intern. Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 58 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting James B. Speta, A
Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 255–57 (2002).
25 Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871, 878 (2009).
26 Id. at 879.
27 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–231 (2000).
28 Crawford, supra note 25, at 880.
29 See generally James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED.
COMM. L.J. 225 (2002).
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In an effort to reduce regulation and barriers to competition in the
telecommunications industry, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of
1996.30 The main effect of the Act was to eliminate many of the crossownership rules previously promulgated by the FCC.31 Under the previous
regime, telephone and cable providers could not be owned by the same entity,
nor could cable providers and broadcasting companies. The Act has been
heavily criticized as producing results that are adverse to its stated goals and
furthering an antiquated regulatory framework in a rapidly changing
telecommunications industry.32
C. RECENT DECISIONS IN AT&T CASES

Recently, the FTC attempted to use its § 45 regulation powers to punish
“data throttling” by AT&T.33 In 2007, AT&T became the sole provider of
Apple’s iPhones and began to offer unlimited data plans.34 Under these plans,
customers could pay a higher rate for their plan but be able to use as much data
as they wanted without worrying about overage charges.35 In 2010, AT&T
stopped offering these plans for unlimited data usage and began forcing
customers to purchase “tiered plans,” where customers must pay a certain
amount per month for a plan with a fixed data cap and extra charges for those
who go over the cap.36
When AT&T did so, it informed its customers that those who had
previously purchased an unlimited data package would be able to keep their
unlimited data plan, even after they renewed their contract.37 AT&T claims this
excessive data usage harmed its overall network and in 2011 began “throttling,”
or reducing data speed, of those on the unlimited data plan after the customer

30 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). The Preamble
of the statute states that it is “[a]n Act to promote competition and reduce regulation in order to
secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and
encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.”
31 Kevin Ryan, Communications Regulation—Ripe for Reform, 17 COMMONLAW CONSPECTUS 771,
789–91 (2009). The Act also reduced restrictions on local telephone companies providing video
services and increased the percentage of households that an individual broadcaster could reach.
32 See id. (arguing that the FCC’s regulatory framework is outdated and not suitable for the
modern telecommunications industry); see also Scott Cooper, Technology and Competition Come to
Telecommunications: Re-Examining Exemptions to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 49 ADMIN. L. REV.
963 (1997) (arguing that the combination of deregulation in the telecommunications industry
under the Telecommunications Act, along with the increasing assumption of common carrier
regulation by the FCC, could harm consumers).
33 FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 835 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 864 F.3d
995 (9th Cir. 2017).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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had used more than a specified amount of data in any given month.38 The
FTC’s complaint against AT&T states that AT&T’s existing agreements with
the unlimited data customers did not mention reduced speeds, AT&T did not
inform unlimited data users of the data throttling at the time of renewal, and
AT&T’s data throttling was not tied to any existing network conditions.39 In
other words, customers who had gone over their data cap were throttled no
matter if there was ample room on the network to support their use or not.40
Although AT&T did tell its customers about the data throttling program, the
FTC contended that its disclosures were inadequate to support its later
actions.41 AT&T informed its customers through monthly bills sent prior to
renewal, along with text messages and e-mails.42 According to the FTC, these
disclosures were inadequate because the monthly bill disclosures did not inform
customers of the degree of data speed reduction or the fact that the reduction
would be imposed after the customers had exceeded their data limits, regardless
of data congestion on the network.43 Furthermore, only a few customers
received the e-mails and text messages.44
Because of this, the FTC contended that AT&T engaged in both unfair and
deceptive practices.45 This was unfair because AT&T “entered into numerous
mobile data contracts that were advertised as providing access to unlimited
mobile data, and that do not provide that [AT&T] may modify, diminish, or
impair the service of customers who use more than a specified amount of data
for permissible activities.”46 The practice was deceptive for much of the same
reason, i.e., AT&T failed to tell its customers that it would effectively limit the
use of their unlimited data plans.47
This case presents an interesting question for the court because, although
AT&T was and is considered a common carrier for much of its activity, its
mobile services were not regulated by the FCC as a common carrier at the
time.48 Since the language of § 45 states that the exemption applies to
“common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce,”49 it was not
entirely clear whether the FTC had jurisdiction to bring such an action against

Id.
FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2015), rev’d, 835 F3d 993
(9th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 864 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2017).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1090.
46 Id. (quoting the FTC’s Complaint).
47 Id.
48 FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 835 F.3d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 864 F.3d
995 (9th Cir. 2017). The FCC has since reclassified AT&T solely as a common carrier. Id.
49 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012).
38
39
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AT&T. The court had to choose between a “status-based interpretation,”
meaning that the common carrier exemption applies regardless of its capacity
during the conduct complained of, so long as the entity is considered a
common carrier in another context, or an “activity-based approach,” which
means that the entity is only exempt from regulation when it is acting in its
capacity as a common carrier.50 In ruling for the FTC, the district court used
the statutory language, legislative history before the Act, and subsequent
amendments.51
First, the court examined the statutory language.52 It looked at the meaning
of the term “common carrier” at the time of the statute’s passage.53 Common
law only regulated entities as common carriers when they were acting in their
capacity as a common carrier.54 The Court cited Santa Fe, Prescott & Phoenix
Railway Co. v. Grant Brothers Construction Co.,55 which articulated a policy reason
for this. The court in Santa Fe stated that the purpose of regulating common
carriers more closely is because the service that they provided as a common
carrier was important to the public.56 Thus, regulating their activities outside of
this context was unnecessary.57
Furthermore, courts also chose the activity-based approach in the context of
the Interstate Commerce Act,58 which was “Acts to regulate commerce” that
§ 45 was referring to at passage.59 The court also determined that the “subject
to” language in § 45 suggests that an activity-based approach was contemplated
by those who drafted the act.60
The court also took the legislative history of the FTC Act to suggest an
activity-based approach.61 The court rejected AT&T’s argument that the
common carrier exception was proposed to prevent regulatory overlap
generally, pointing to Congressional debate at the time of passage suggesting
that the purpose of the exception was to prevent overlap between common
carrier regulations.62 This was also the approach taken by the Second Circuit in
Federal Trade Commission v. Verity International, LTD.63
See 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1091.
See id. at 1091–98.
52 Id. at 1091.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 228 U.S. 177 (1913).
56 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1092 (quoting 228 U.S. 177).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1092–93.
59 Id. at 1091. The Communications Act of 1934, which created the FCC, was not passed until
1934. Id.
60 Id. at 1093.
61 Id. at 1093–94.
62 Representative Stevens, when discussing what entities would fall under the regulation, said
[t]hey ought to be under the jurisdiction of this commission in order to protect
the public . . . just the same as where a railroad company engages in work outside of that of
50
51
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Next, the court considered which interpretation of the statue “illuminate[s]
the meaning of the plain language.”64 Considering this, the court preferred the
FTC’s interpretation because of the giant loophole that AT&T’s preferred
interpretation would open.65 Simply put, AT&T’s interpretation would make
no sense for Congress to create such a regulatory gap when enacting regulation
to control the market power of large corporations. Thus, this could not have
been its intent when drafting the statute.
It was of no consequence to the court that the FCC had taken full control
over AT&T’s regulation because AT&T was not the only common carrier, and
AT&T did nothing to show how that gap would be filled in other instances.66
This would allow businesses to structure themselves in a way that would escape
FTC regulation.67 The court referenced the FTC’s brief to note that this was
not just a wild academic concern.68 Businesses could introduce small elements
of common carrier activity and escape the FTC’s data and privacy regulation.69
Google has expressed an intention to do just that.70
The court says that, although it is clear that the activity-based solution is
correct, the FTC’s continued insistence on this approach entitles it to Skidmore
deference.71 Under this approach, an agency’s interpretation of its own statute
is entitled to deference when the thoroughness of the agency’s consideration,
validity of its reasoning, consistency with prior interpretations, and its
persuasive power suggest its proposed interpretation.72 The FTC has fought for
the activity-based approach at congressional hearings and in cases whenever the
issue has been presented.73 The only possible interpretations to the contrary
have actually been the FTC arguing that the entity being regulated was simply
not a common carrier.74 Thus, the FTC’s consistency in this interpretation
would likely entitle it to Skidmore deference.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit took a different view of the statute’s language
and history. The court dismissed the pre-Act history cited by the district court,
ruling that it did nothing to show how Congress intended to use the words
a public carrier. In that case such work ought to come within the scope of this commission for
investigation.
Id. at 1094 (quoting 51 Cong. Rec. 8996 1914).
63 443 F.3d 48 (2006).
64 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1094.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1096.
67 Id. at 1094–95.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1095.
71 Id. at 1101.
72 FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 835 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 864
F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2017).
73 See id. (collecting instances when the FTC had demonstrated this view).
74 Id.
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common carrier when it drafted the statute.75 The court ruled that the language
of the other exceptions surrounding the common carrier exceptions were
clearly status-based, which suggested that this exception should also be viewed
as status-based.76
The court noted that, considering the amendment to the Packers and
Stockyard exemption in the Act, this recognition may cut away from the FTC’s
proposed interpretation.77 Before the amendment, the common carrier and
Packers and Stockyards exceptions contained the same language.78 By later
adding the words “insofar as,” Congress clearly expressed intent to regulate
corporations subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act with an activity-based
approach.79 If it had this intent, why did it not add the same language to the
common carrier exception?80 Furthermore, the court questioned why Congress
even added the extra language to the Packers and Stockyards exception if the
“subject to” language already indicated an activity-based approach.81
The court of appeals also did away with the district court’s Skidmore
deference conclusion. Because of its interpretation of the Act’s language and
the legislative history, the FTC’s consistent interpretation is erroneous and
unable to overcome the doubt cast on it by the other factors.82
III. DISCUSSION
The court of appeals’ opinion was wrong, both as a matter of law and policy.
As to the law, the text of the statute is at best ambiguous and likely leads to a
conclusion that an activity-based approach was contemplated by Congress.
Although the legislative and subsequent history does not exclusively point to an
activity-based approach, most of it does, especially when one takes into context the
understanding of common carrier regulation at the time of passage. As a policy matter, a
status-based interpretation would lead to a large loophole in the law that would
allow corporations to structure themselves to get around FTC regulation.
There are likely instances where other agencies either cannot or will not take up
the slack; and even in the event that another agency literally exists to regulate,
the FTC’s broad regulatory power lends support to the proposition that it is best
suited to regulate these non-common carrier activities.
75 Id. at 999. The court noted, “While these cases recognize a distinction between common
carrier and non-common carrier activit[y] . . . they do not show that when Congress used the term
‘common carrier’ . . . it could only have meant ‘common carrier to the extent engaged in common
carrier activity.’ ” Id.
76 Id. at 998.
77 Id. at 999.
78 Id. Both exceptions contained only the “subject to” language.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1003.
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A. LEGAL CONCLUSIONS

The district court’s opinion is more persuasive because it properly weighs
the common carrier exception’s text and history. As a preliminary matter, the
court of appeals’ reasons for rejecting the FTC’s proposed interpretation do not
mean much. It claims that the fact that the status-based interpretations in the
exceptions for banks, savings and loan institutions, and federal credit unions
suggests that the common carrier exception should be construed as status-based
as well. The language in these exceptions, however, may lead to the opposite
conclusion. The language in those exceptions contains no qualifying language
like the “subject to” language before the common carrier exception. The fact
that Congress drafted these exceptions differently suggests that it meant for
these exceptions to work differently.
The court’s argument about the addition of the “insofar as” language before
the Packers and Stockyards exception, though slightly more persuasive, also
falls short of the mark. The appeals court ruled that the addition of this
language closed the door on the FTC’s interpretation because Congress clearly
meant to add an activity-based status to businesses subject to the Packers and
Stockyards Act.83 By not adding this language to the common carrier
exception, it implicitly expressed an intention to regulate common carriers by
the status-based approach. This does suggest that AT&T’s interpretation is
correct, but it should not be considered dispositive.
First off, just a year after the addition of the “insofar as” language to the
Packers and Stockyards exception, the court decided Crosse & Blackwell Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission.84 This case ruled that the language in the Packers and
Stockyards exemption (the same language currently in the common carrier
exemption) suggested an activity-based approach before the amendment.85
There were problems with businesses structuring themselves to get around the
Packers and Stockyards exemption, and some lower courts were erroneously
using a status-based approach.86 Congress added this language to ensure that
this would not be possible.87
There is, however, a decent argument that this should not matter. The court
may only move on to other interpretational techniques if the statute is
ambiguous. As the court correctly states in the AT&T Ninth Circuit decision,
“[i]t is unnecessary to rely on legislative history to construe unambiguous
statutory language.”88 Thus, even if Congress did not intend to create a statusId. at 999–1003.
262 F.2d 600 (4th Cir. 1959).
85 Id. at 605.
86 Id. at 604–05.
87 Id. at 605.
88 FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 835 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 864
F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2017).
83
84
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based approach for the common carrier exception, it may have created one by
adding the “insofar as” language to the Packers and Stockyards exception.89
Considering the structure of the statute, however, the language here is
ambiguous. The fact that the banks, savings and loan institutions, and federal
credit unions exceptions do not contain any qualifying language means that the
exact same argument can be made for why this exception should be read as
suggesting an activity-based approach. If Congress clearly intended a statusbased approach, why did it add the “subject to” language to the common carrier
exception?90 This creates ambiguity in the statute and allows the court to look
at things like purpose and legislative history to determine how the exception
should work.
Once we turn to purpose and legislative history, it is clear that the activitybased approach should win the day. The best historical argument that those
wanting a status-based approach have is the later addition of the “insofar as”
language to the Packers and Stockyards exception.91 The history suggesting the
FTC’s suggested interpretation, however, is more convincing. When the Act
was passed, courts used an activity-based approach when regulating common
carriers under the Interstate Commerce Act.92
Furthermore, there is
Congressional testimony from the floor of the House when the Act was passed
suggesting an activity-based approach.93 Thus, the legislative history is more
suggestive of an activity-based approach than a status-based approach.
B. POLICY RESULTS

Another way that the Ninth Circuit decision may be criticized is because of
the incentive that it creates for businesses to structure themselves in a way that
escapes FTC regulation. As noted in the FTC’s complaint, this is not an airy,
academic concern.94 Google, for example, has already expressed an interest in
becoming a virtual wireless carrier, which would exempt it from FTC regulation
under the status-based approach.95
Although there is no indication that Google has done so solely to escape
FTC regulation, a look at the implications of status and activity-based
Id. at 997.
Id.
91 Id.
92 FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2015), rev’d, 835 F.3d
993 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 864 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2017).
93 Id. at 1094 (quoting Rep. Stevens “[w]here a railroad company engages in work outside that
of a public carrier. In that case such work ought to come within the scope of this Commission
for investigation.”).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 1095. Since the court ruling, Google has actually enacted this plan, offering cellular
service under Google Project Fi. See PROJECT FI-, https://fi.google.com/about/ (last visited
Nov. 19, 2017). See also Brian X. Chen, While Limited, Wi-Fi-First Phones Are a Good, Frugal Bet,
N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2016) (explaining, among other things, how Google-Fi works).
89
90
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approaches is useful in showing the negative consequences of solely statusbased regulation.
Google has been investigated numerous times by
administrative agencies (both foreign and domestic) for violations of antitrust
and consumer protection laws.96 It has had particular trouble with the FTC.
For example, Google is currently under investigation by the FTC for possible
antitrust violations stemming from its ownership of Android.97 In 2012,
Google was fined over $20 million by the FTC for misrepresenting in its
privacy policy the way in which it would use “cookies” to track internet data.98
Making matters worse, the reason that the fine was so large was because this
was an express violation of a previous settlement with the FTC.99 Thus,
Google has shown a proclivity for activity that the FTC deems worthy to
regulate.100 If the status-based approach were chosen, Google would be exempt
from FTC regulation. Even though agencies like the FCC may literally have the
power to pick up the slack, it will neither have the experience or the tenacity
that the FTC does in regulating many of these consumer protection and antitrust issues.
It is true that the appeals court decision leaves the question of whether an
entity may be exempt from FTC regulation when only a miniscule portion of its
business derives from common carrier activities. Practically, however, this does
not soften the blow to consumers, especially in the telecommunications
context.
Since a considerable infrastructure is required to carry out
telecommunications services, it is unlikely that any entity could incorporate an
insubstantial amount of a telecommunication common carrier service into its
business.
Companies that are already classified as common carriers will also be able to
escape this kind of regulation. Many of these companies have also had similar
96 See generally Jack Nicas & Brent Kendall, FTC Extends Probe Into Google’s Android, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 26, 2016, 3:33 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-extends-probe-into-googles-android1461699217 (examining the FTC’s current antitrust investigation of Google and a similar
investigation in the past).
97 Id.
98 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC
Charges it Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s Safari Internet Browser (Aug.
9, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-millionsettle-ftc-charges-it-misrepresented.
99 Agreement Containing Consent Order, In re Google Inc., https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default
t/files/documents/cases/2011/03/110330googlebuzzagreeorder.pdf.
100 Google has been in trouble with the FTC a number of other times not mentioned in the
Note. See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Google to Refund Consumers at Least $19
Million to Settle FTC Complaint It Unlawfully Billed Parents for Children’s Unauthorized In-App
Charges (Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/09/google-refun
d-consumers-least-19-million-settle-ftc-complaint-it; Press Release, Federal Trade Commission,
Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve FTC Competition Concerns In the
Markets for Devices Like Smart Phones, Games and Tablets, and in Online Search (Jan. 3, 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/01/google-agrees-change-its-business-pr
actices-resolve-ftc.
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kinds of trouble that Google has had with the FTC. Take, for example, AT&T,
who was forced to settle for over $100 million with the FTC in 2014 for
overbilling its customers.101 Verizon has also been investigated by the FTC for
§ 5 violations resulting from the issuance of unsecure internet routers.102
Many other large and growing corporations could easily incorporate
common carrier services into their businesses. Amazon, for example, could get
status as a common carrier by registering its Amazon Prime delivery trucks as
common carriers. Thus, a status-based interpretation of the exemption could
provide companies with an incentive to add small elements of common carrier
activity to exempt themselves from FTC regulation. Given the FTC’s current
ability to regulate these businesses, many of which are the large corporations
that consumers have the most direct contact with, that could have large effects
on the type of protection that consumers get from these corporations.
Furthermore, although the FCC may regulate telecommunications common
carriers, it does not have an important regulatory tool that the FTC does: the
ability to order consumer refunds.103 The FTC has used its ability to order
refunds as a powerful tool to regulate harm to consumers by
telecommunications common carriers.104 Although the FCC has the ability to
make consumer refunds a part of any settlement agreement,105 its inability to
order the refund gives it less bargaining power required to enter the settlement
agreement. Since class action arbitration waivers will generally be upheld by
courts106 and most telecommunications common carriers are large corporations
that will generally have these provisions in their consumer contracts, consumers
seeking redress for small wrongs will be largely out of luck.
Aggregation of claims may make it cheaper for individual consumers to
bring their claim. For consumers seeking small amounts of redress, arbitration
costs will sometimes outweigh the harm to the consumer, making it useless for
consumers to bring small claims unless they are able to lump their claim
together with others who have similar small claims. Since many consumers
have signed agreements with the corporations precluding them from
aggregating their claims, they may not be able to get redress without FTC
enforcement.
101 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, AT&T to Pay $80 Million to FTC for Consumer
Refunds in Mobile Cramming Case (Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-relea
ses/2014/10/att-pay-80-million-ftc-consumer-refunds-mobile-cramming-case.
102 Closing Letter from FTC to Dana Rosenfeld, Counsel for Verizon Communications, Inc.
(Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/closing_letters/verizon-commu
nications-inc./141112verizonclosingletter.pdf.
103 47 U.S.C.S. § 503 (2010).
104 Federal Trade Commission, supra note 101.
105 Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, AT&T to pay $7.75 million for letting
scammers bill consumers for sham ‘directory assistance’ services (Aug. 8, 2016), https://apps.fcc.
gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-340650A1.pdf.
106 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s recent ruling in Federal Trade Commission v. AT&T
Mobility, LLC was legally wrong and will produce negative policy results.
Legally, the decision was wrong as a matter of statutory interpretation. The
Ninth Circuit ruled that the text of the FTC Act’s § 5 unambiguously points to
a status-based regulation of common carriers. The statute, however, is
ambiguous in light of other exclusions. Thus, the court should look at the
history and purpose of the statute to discern the common carrier exception’s
meaning. When history and purpose are considered, it is clear that an activitybased regulatory approach was meant at the Act’s passage.
As a policy matter, this decision would lead to a loophole in common carrier
regulation. Corporations will be able to add elements of common carrier
services into their business and escape regulation from the FTC. This will lead
to significant effects on consumers, since the FTC is now tasked with carrying
out much of consumer protection law. Furthermore, common carriers such as
telecommunications and internet service providers are almost necessary for
daily American life and almost all consumers interact with these businesses in
one way or another. Although other agencies like the FCC legally have the
authority to pick up the slack, the FTC is the proper agency to undertake this
role because of its immense experience in the consumer protection arena.
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